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Hannibal the cannibal? Polybius on Barcid atrocities1
 
At the time when Hannibal planned to march on Italy from Spain with his army, it was 
foreseen that he would find it very difficult to feed the troops and keep them constantly 
provided with supplies. The difficulties of the march seemed almost insuperable both 
owing to the distance and to the numbers and the savagery of the barbarians in the 
intervening lands. It seems that the problem was more than once discussed in the Council, 
and that one of Hannibal’s friends, Hannibal Monomachos, stated that he foresaw only 
one way by which it would be possible to reach Italy. When Hannibal asked him for an 
explanation, he replied that he must teach his troops to eat human flesh and accustom 
them to this...  
Hannibal had nothing to say against the boldness and practicality of this suggestion, but 
he could persuade neither himself nor his friends actually to adopt it. They say the acts of 
cruelty in Italy of which Hannibal is accused were the works of this man, but due no less 
to those of circumstance. 
Polybius 9.24.4–8 
 
This important passage has not received the attention it deserves, perhaps because the 
sensationalism of cannibalism was less appealing to earlier historians.2 It appears in 
Polybius’ digression on the character of Hannibal (9.22–6), and is the central example 
in his argument that Hannibal’s reputation for cruelty was the product not of his 
                                                 
1 I would like to thank the readers at the Cardiff Historical Papers for some extremely useful 
suggestions, and Dr Guy Bradley and Professor Nick Fisher in particular for their support and advice. 
2 For example Walbank, in his magisterial commentary on Polybius, says nothing about the 
cannibalism. Frank W. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius, 3 vols (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1967), vol. 2, p. 153. Note Tatham’s brief attempt to rationalise the story as a 
misunderstanding of soldiers’ slang along the lines of Xen. Anab. 4.8.14: ‘Soldiers, those enemy over 
there are the only ones likely to stand against us and our achieving our aims; if possible, we must eat 
them raw’. Meaburn T. Tatham, ‘Livy, 23, 5, 12’, Classical Review, 2, 7 (1888), p. 226. However, 
Polybius was perfectly capable of understanding the difference between actual and metaphorical 
cannibalism, as the present discussion will show.  
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character, but of external factors: the bad advice of his companions and the nature of 
the military situation.3
Polybius includes the story of the cannibalistic plan in his excursus (aristeia) 
on Hannibal to illustrate the cruel nature of one of the Carthaginian general’s 
companions, a certain Hannibal Monomachos. He uses the episode in two ways: 
firstly, to challenge the view of Hannibal’s cruelty found in other, mainly Roman, 
writers’ accounts; secondly, to pursue a more general argument about the nature of 
character and the influences upon it. Both elements have been discussed by other 
scholars to some extent; however, the suggestion that Hannibal seriously considered 
cannibalism has largely been overlooked.4 In fact, the suggestion, and the way in 
which Polybius uses it, sheds light on Polybius as a historian, as well as on the 
polemic that surrounded the representation of Hannibal in Antiquity. The anecdote 
will be considered in the context of other stories about Hannibalic cannibalism and 
cruelty in the Second Punic War. The aim of this paper is not to consider whether 
Hannibal’s army ever did practice cannibalism, but to ask why Polybius chose to 
include this particular story at this point in the Histories. It will be shown that 
Polybius’ contextualisation of the story, both in terms of his argument about the 
nature of Hannibal’s cruelty (ōmotēta) and the way in which he makes the story seem 
                                                 
3 This discussion of Hannibal’s character (9.22–6) survives in a collection of Virtues and Vices in the 
tenth-century Byzantine manuscript known as the Constantine Excerpts, but it appears to follow on 
from an analysis of generalship that can be placed amongst the surviving fragments of Book Nine. As 
such, it probably featured in Polybius’ narrative sometime in the period 212/11–209/8 BC, at a point 
when the tide of war was beginning to turn in the Romans’ favour. See Walbank, Historical 
Commentary, 2.10–11. In his character analysis of the Carthaginian general, Polybius looks back to the 
beginning of the war (9.24.4–8) and onwards to the increasing number of problems Hannibal faced in 
Italy after the fall of his ally Capua in 211 BC (9.26). 
4 On Hannibal’s cruelty see Howard V. Canter, ‘The character of Hannibal’, Classical Journal, 24, 8 
(1928/9), pp. 564–77; Karl Christ, ‘Zur Beurteilung Hannibals’, Historia, 17 (1968), pp. 463–5; see 
also Walbank, Historical Commentary, 2.153 for references to earlier scholars who have rejected 
stories of cruelty. Concerning Polybius on character see Paul Pédech, La méthode historique de Polybe 
(Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1964), esp. p. 246; Frank W. Walbank, Polybius (Berkeley, Los Angeles, 
and London: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 92–6; Arthur M. Eckstein, Moral Vision in the 
Histories of Polybius (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1995), pp. 
239–54; John Marincola, Greek Historians (Greece and Rome New Surveys 31), (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), esp. p. 146. 
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plausible, is designed to show his admiration for the general. Moreover, it will be 
argued that he regarded Hannibal’s decision to reject anthrōpophagia (cannibalism) 
not so as much a practical matter, but as a moral one.  
It is the combination of pragmatic and moral elements in Polybius’ Histories 
that has made them so controversial for modern commentators. Some writers 
emphasise Polybius’ hard-headed and utilitarian purposes in writing history and his 
lack of interest in ethical matters.5 Sacks, for example, dismisses Polybius’ ethical 
discussions as little more than unsystematic digressions, of no historiographical 
relevance.6 Those who prefer to emphasise Polybius’ morality, on the other hand, 
tend to argue that his ethical stance throughout the Histories not only steers his 
readers to consider the moral dimension in order to improve their virtue, but also 
dictates his own approach to, and interpretation of, the events and historical 
personages he scrutinises.7  
Scholars agree though that Polybius conceives human character to be multi-
faceted and subject to change.8 The relationship between character and external 
stimuli is dynamic, making it difficult to perceive the true nature of a man of affairs 
such as Hannibal (Polyb. 9.24.1–2). Polybius’ understanding of the historical process 
favours this dynamic notion, where events are shaped by the characters of prominent 
men, but also have the potential to mould them. For Polybius, the truest test of 
                                                 
5 See André Aymard, ‘Le Fragment de Polybe “Sur les traîtres” (xviii, 13–15)’, Revue des études 
anciennes, 42 (1940), pp. 9–19; Pédech, Méthode historique, p. 219; Walbank, Polybius, p. 173; Peter 
Green, From Alexander to Actium: The Historical Evolution of the Hellenistic Age (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 278–82. 
6 Kenneth Sacks, Polybius on the Writing of History (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of 
California Press, 1981), esp. pp. 132–6. 
7 Rudolf von Scala, Die Studien des Polybios, vol. I (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1890); Carl Wunderer, 
Polybios: Lebens- und Weltanschauung aus dem zweiten vorchristlichen Jahrhundert (Leipzig: 
Dieterichscher Verlag, 1927), esp. 15–18; Karl-Ernst Petzold, Studien zur Methode des Polybios und zu 
ihrer Auswertung (Munich: Beck, 1969); Burkhard Meissner, ‘ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΙΚΗ ΙΣΤΟΡΙΑ: Polybios 
über den Zweck pragmatischer Geschichtsschreibung’, Saeculum, 37 (1986), pp. 313–51; Eckstein, 
Moral Vision; Craige B. Champion, Cultural Politics in Polybius’s Histories (Berkeley, Los Angeles, 
and London: University of California Press, 2004). 
8 Walbank, Polybius, p. 93; Eckstein, Moral Vision, pp. 239–40. 
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character comes during extremes of fortune or when conditions are toughest.9 The 
crossing of the Alps was such a test for Hannibal, for as Polybius suggests, ‘the 
difficulties of the march seemed almost insuperable’ (9.24.4). The decisions Hannibal 
made about food-supply for the army had the potential to shape his character and 
determine the course of the campaign. There would be other difficult choices for him 
to make, however, and the extent to which Polybius’ observations on Hannibal’s 
cruelty, advanced in the aristeia, are confirmed in his presentation of Barcid atrocities 
throughout the war will be considered in the final section of this paper. The 
observations demonstrate that the balance of Polybius’ political realism and ethical 
stance is skewed towards the latter, whilst his representation of Hannibal’s acts of 
cruelty in the Histories confirms, to some degree, the argument deployed at 9.24. 
Contrary to the view of Sacks and other ‘pragmatists’, utilitarian interpretations of 
Polybius’ historical narrative do not reveal the full picture.10 His ethical digressions, 
shed light on ‘plainer’ sections of historical narrative, and reveal the complex moral 
criteria that underpin Polybius’ presentation of events and historical characters. 
 
The tradition of Hannibalic cannibalism and cruelty 
The association of Hannibal and cannibalism appears in two variants: Polybius’ is 
echoed briefly by Dio Cassius (see below); another account is given by the Augustan 
historian Livy. The differences between the versions are instructive. Livy indicates 
perhaps how some Romans regarded Hannibal, although he distances himself from 
the tale by placing it in a speech. He reports that, when addressing an audience at 
Capua in 216 BC, the consul Gaius Terentius Varro claimed: 
                                                 
9 Polyb. 6.2.5–6; Marincola, Greek Historians, p. 146. 
10 See n. 6. 
Cardiff Historical Papers 2007/9 
Hannibal the cannibal? 5
The Carthaginian is dragging after him an army that is not even made up of natives of 
Africa, he has collected a force from the furthest corners of the earth, from the ocean 
straits, and the Pillars of Hercules, men devoid of any sense of right, destitute of the 
condition, and almost of the speech of men. Savage and barbarous by nature and habit, 
their general has made them still more brutal by building up bridges and barriers with 
human bodies and – I shudder to say it – teaching them to feed on human flesh. What 
man, if he were merely a native of Italy, would not be horrified at the thought of looking 
upon men who feast upon what it is impious even to touch as his lords and masters, 
looking to Africa and above all to Carthage for his laws, and having to submit to Italy 
becoming a dependency of the Numidians and the Moors?  
Livy 23.5.11–13 
 
Varro portrays cannibalism as deeply polluting, impious, and transforming (in 
rendering the men even more brutal than they were naturally). As such, he reflects 
Graeco-Roman attitudes to deliberate acts of cannibalism, where those who partook 
were considered to have entered ‘a savage, non-human, asocial zone’, beyond the 
recognised conventions of human society, and to have become the predatory enemies 
of mankind: beasts or monsters.11 If Varro’s accusation were true, it would be an 
extremely damning indictment of the barbarity and cruelty of Hannibal and his men, 
and a confirmation that Hannibal, as Livy asserts, was a man of inhumana crudelitas 
(‘inhuman cruelty’, 21.4, cf. 22.59). 
However, by putting the statement into the mouth of Varro – whom elsewhere 
he reviles as a demagogue (22.26, 34, 38) – and stating that this speech ‘increased the 
contempt for him’ among the Campanian audience (23.5.2), Livy makes Varro’s 
                                                 
11 Barton Kunstler, ‘The werewolf figure and its adoption into the Greek political vocabulary’, 
Classical World, 84 (1991), p. 191; Marcel Detienne, Dionysos Slain, trans. Mireille and Leonard 
Muellner (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), pp. 56–8. 
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accusations seem exaggerated. Livy’s omission of such lurid details in his campaign 
narratives also suggests that he meant his audience to realise that the claims were 
stretching reality. Thus, despite the historian’s famous character sketch of Hannibal’s 
inhumana crudelitas and several specific examples of his cruelties,12 Varro’s 
accusations are made to seem implausible. For Livy then, Hannibal may have been 
cruel, but he was not that cruel. Whilst undermining Varro’s accusations, Livy 
evidently felt the need to include the bridge-building and cannibalistic atrocities in his 
narrative, probably because the stories were circulating in some form at the time he 
was writing.13  
It may well have been the case that some of the stories were also current when 
Polybius was composing his work in the mid second century BC, but the inclusion of 
the suggestion of cannibalism, probably relates more to an interest shown by earlier 
writers. Like Livy, Polybius rejects the possibility that it happened, since he asserts 
that Hannibal refused to adopt the ‘logistical measure’ for the march across the Alps. 
Thus he could have dismissed, or even omitted, the story. Indeed, the accusations in 
Varro’s speech seem to be the sort of fantastic and sensationalistic assertions of 
cruelty that Polybius condemns earlier writers for introducing into the reign of 
Hieronymus of Syracuse (7.7) and the fall of Agathocles in Egypt (15.34, 36).14 
                                                 
12 e.g. 21.14; 21.57.13–14; 23.19 (which Livy doubts); 24.45; 30.20. On the portrayal of Hannibal in 
Livy see Christ, ‘Zur Beurteilung Hannibals’, pp. 469–73. 
13 Appian (Hann. 5.28; Pun. 63; cf. Eutrop. 3.11.1) reports the killing of prisoners after Cannae and 
goes on to note the construction of a bridge from their cadavers. Florus (1.22.18) also mentions the 
bridge of Cannae slain. Val Max 9.2 ext. 2 claims Hannibal’s army crossed the river Vergellus by using 
such a bridge. Two other episodes of cannibalism in the Second Punic War, at Saguntum (219/8 BC) 
and Petelia (215 BC), are not relevant to this discussion, because they represent the conditions of 
Hannibal’s opponents under siege and are reported by rather late and unreliable sources: Saguntum: 
Petronius Satyricon 141; Juvenal 15.114; Augustine (Civ. Dei, 3.20, ‘as some assert’); Sil. Ital. Pun. 
2.513–25 (where it is contemplated, but not adopted). Petelia: Petronius Satyr. 141 (cf. Sil. Ital. Pun. 
12.431–2, ‘a second Saguntum’). In such accounts, it appears that Hannibal and his army merely create 
the conditions in which starvation would occur; the story provides the backdrop for those authors keen 
to linger on the suffering and dilemmas of starving defenders. 
14 Walbank, Historical Commentary, 2.39. Polybius 7.7 may have Baton and Eumachus in mind in his 
criticisms. See also Walbank, Historical Commentary, 2.494–5 on sensationalist accounts of 
Agathocles. Cf. Polyb. 2.56 for criticisms of Phylarchus’ approach to history. Walbank, ‘History and 
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However, Polybius appears to make every effort to persuade the reader that the 
proposal had been made (see below). 
By the time Polybius was writing his Histories, Hannibal’s cruelty was already 
a controversial topic (9.22.8). The writer does not specify who was involved in the 
debate, reporting only that ‘among the Romans’ Hannibal had a reputation for 
excessive cruelty (9.26.11), whilst ‘they say’ that a certain Hannibal Monomachos 
was primarily responsible for the atrocities in Italy attributed to Hannibal (9.24.8). 
One might speculate that Roman writers such as Fabius Pictor and Cincius Alimentus, 
as well as the pro-Carthaginian Sosylus and Silenus, all of whom Polybius consulted, 
were involved in the debate.15 Some of the discourse was probably reflected in 
popular tradition throughout Italy and Greece. The stories of cruelty certainly seem to 
have circulated early enough to be part of a contemporary discourse, perhaps even a 
propaganda war, during or soon after Hannibal’s campaigns.16 It is likely that the 
tradition of cannibalism emerged in this context, and at some point was employed in 
the condemnation of Hannibal’s character. 
 
Cruelty, companions, and context in Polybius’ Hannibalic aristeia 
Whilst admitting that the Romans regarded Hannibal as cruel (9.26.11), Polybius 
deploys the story of Monomachos to counter this. He argues that a man’s character is 
not necessarily revealed by his actions (9.22.8–10), reasoning that this could not be 
the case because it does not take into account the influence of friends and companions 
                                                                                                                                            
Tragedy’, Historia, 9 (1960), pp. 216–34; Guido Schepens, ‘Polybius’ criticism of Phylarchus’, in 
Guido Schepens and Jan Bollansée (eds), The Shadow of Polybius: Intertextuality as a Research Tool 
in Greek Historiography. Proceedings of the International Colloquium. Leuven, 21–22 September 2001 
(Leuven, Paris, and Dudley: Peeters, 2005), pp. 141–64. 
15 Walbank, Historical Commentary, 1.28–9, 33–4. 
16 On propagandistic claims and counter-claims surrounding Hannibal see Louis P. Rawlings, 
‘Hannibal and Hercules’, in Louis P. Rawlings and Hugh Bowden (eds), Herakles and Hercules: 
Exploring a Graeco-Roman Divinity (Swansea: Classical Press of Wales, 2005), esp. pp. 156–9. 
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or the pressures of circumstance (9.22.10; 9.26.10); he insists that such factors 
sometimes lead men to undertake actions contrary to their disposition. Polybius 
deploys several other historical examples to illustrate this,17 and indeed offers such 
opinions throughout the Histories. He portrays Hieronymus, the young tyrant of 
Syracuse, being led astray by bad confidants (7.4.4–6 cf. 7.6.7). Similarly, Philip V 
(7.13.3–14.6) is said to have accepted frequently the counsel of certain advisers, 
which variously enhanced or harmed his prospects and reputation.18 In the case of 
Hannibal, Polybius argues that anyone who studies only his actions in Italy will never 
perceive his true nature, because his nearest friends differed so much in character 
(9.24.1). The writer claims, ‘they say that the acts of cruelty in Italy of which 
Hannibal is accused were the works of this man [Hannibal Monomachos], but due no 
less to those of circumstance’ (9.24.8). 
If Polybius’ argument is based on a case of mistaken identity to a certain 
extent, then what can be said of Hannibal Monomachos? Polybius portrays him as one 
of Hannibal’s advisors, and his intimacy with the commander is suggested by their 
friendship (philia). It is less clear what the origins of such ties were; nor is it evident 
whether he had political connections back in Carthage, or if he was an officer who 
had risen by merit in the hard years of campaigning in the Spanish theatre. The name 
Monomachos, ‘Single-combat-fighter’, is otherwise unknown among the 
Carthaginians, and should probably be regarded as a nickname.19 Greek and Roman 
sources sometimes provide such names as an alternative to patronymics; how they 
                                                 
17 Other examples are deployed in 9.23: Agathocles of Syracuse, Cleomenes, and Philip V. Polybius 
argues that even the policies of states such as Athens and Sparta were influenced by their advisors and 
rulers. 
18 Walbank, Polybius, pp. 93–4. 
19 Monomachos could denote gladiator in the Greek of this period (cf. Polyb. 30.25.6; 30.26.1; 
31.28.5), but it seems a less plausible way of interpreting the nickname of this Hannibal than someone 
‘keen on single combat’ (cf. 1.45.9, 35.5.1). Cf. below n. 23. 
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came into use is little understood.20 Of course, the name ‘Hannibal’ appears to have 
been common in Carthage, and those who possessed it needed to be told apart 
somehow.21 Yet it is worth considering whether a Greek tag like ‘Monomachos’ was 
one that a Carthaginian would have used, or whether it was a translation of a Punic 
equivalent.22 It is a suitably martial name for an officer of Hannibal and might have 
been earned through a notable exploit – after all, in his youth Hannibal had gained a 
reputation for daring in battle, and single combats could well have occurred between 
natives and others in the context of the warrior culture of the Spanish theatre.23
If Polybius knew of the rest of Monomachos’ career and included it in his 
Histories, the material has been lost. Lenschau suggests that he was ‘Hannibal the 
Carthaginian’, sent by Hannibal Barca to Syracuse to convince Hieronymus to break 
his alliance with Rome, and subsequently to Carthage to facilitate further negotiations 
                                                 
20 In the First Punic War, Polybius introduces us to ‘Hannibal called the Rhodian’ (1.46.4); in the 
Second, to Mago the Samnite (Polyb. 9.25 – a philos and a man as greedy as Hannibal Barca – who 
commanded in Bruttium. Hannibal’s greed was attested by ‘the Carthaginians’ and by Massanissa, 
whom Polybius claimed to have interviewed); in the Third, to Mago the Bruttian (Polyb. 36.5.1). 
21 Note, for example, the commander of a Celtic contingent at Lilybaeum, Hannibal son of Hannibal 
(Polyb. 1.43.4), who was one of three Hannibals operating in the vicinity of the city in 250/49 BC, the 
others being Hannibal son of Hamilcar, trierarch and philos of Adherbal (Polyb. 1.44.1), and Hannibal 
the Rhodian (Polyb. 1.46–7). 
22 In modern translations and discussions Bomilcar Basileus is frequently punicised as ‘Bomilcar the 
Sufete’. For Greek usage of basileus to label this chief Punic magistracy see Otto Metzler, Geschichte 
der Karthager II (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1896), pp. 62–6; Victor Ehrenberg, s.v. 
‘Sufeten’, in August F. Pauly and Georg Wissowa (eds), Realencyclopädie der Classischen 
Altertumswissenschaft (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler) 2, 7 (1931), cols. 645–6. The ‘nickname’ Barca applied 
to Hamilcar is evidently not a Greek or Roman word, but possibly derives from the Punic Brq, which 
probably meant ‘lightning’ or ‘flashing-blade’. See Liddell-Scott, s.v. Barkas; Walbank, Historical 
Commentary, 1.119; Serge Lancel, Hannibal, trans. Antonia Nevill (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), p. 6; B. 
Dexter Hoyos, Hannibal’s Dynasty: Power and Politics in the Western Mediterranean, 247–183 BC 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 238, n. 11. 
23 On Iberian and Gallic monomachiai and Scipio’s gladiatorial games at New Carthage 206 BC see 
Louis P. Rawlings, ‘Celts, Spaniards and Samnites: warriors in a soldiers’ war’, in Tim Cornell, Boris 
Rankov, and Philip Sabin (eds), The Second Punic War: a Reappraisal (Bulletin of the Institute of 
Classical Studies, supp. 67, 1996), p. 87. Single combat was a common occurrence between Roman 
officers and western barbarians: Marcellus fought Britomarus in 222 BC (Polyb. 2.34.5; Plut. Marc. 7; 
Propertius 4.10.39; cf. Cic. Tusc. 4.49; Florus 2.4) and in the Third Punic War, Scipio Aemilianus 
engaged with a barbarian in a monomachia (Polyb. 35.5.1–2). See also Stephen Oakley, ‘Single 
Combat in the Roman Republic’, Classical Quarterly, New Series, 35, 2 (1985), p. 392–410. Perhaps 
some Carthaginians also engaged in this activity. Note that Polybius (1.45.9) claims that the Romans 
and Carthaginian mercenaries fought so fiercely and with so little organisation at a battle at Lilybaeum 
in 250/49 BC that it reminded him of monomachiai. Interestingly the battle involved a Celtic 
contingent commanded by a certain Hannibal. 
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(Polyb. 7.2.2). Livy (24.6.2) reports that this ambassador was ‘a young man’, whilst 
Polybius indicates that he was Hannibal’s trierarch – often a prestigious position 
appropriate for a close confidant of the commander.24 The identification is not secure, 
however, and the popularity of Hannibal as a name among Carthaginians has led some 
scholars to reject Lenschau’s suggestion.25 If the ambassador-trierarch Hannibal was a 
different individual, then 9.24 may be Monomachos’ only walk-on part in Punic 
history. 
As the singular advocate of a specific policy, Monomachos appears aptly 
named to serve the rhetorical point for which he is deployed, that is, to exculpate 
Hannibal from the charge of being naturally and excessively cruel. In order to 
substantiate his argument, Polybius needed an example of the extreme cruelty of 
Hannibal’s advisor, and one that would seem plausible to his audience. Although it 
might derive from Silenus or some sensationalist writer, Polybius does not relate the 
story in its original context (i.e. the start of the march), but includes it later, in the 
digression on Hannibal’s character, for a polemical purpose.26 Nevertheless, it draws 
its plausibility from that original context in a number of ways.  
Firstly, Polybius emphasises that the march did create problems of supply. On 
several occasions he iterates that supplies dwindled, losses of baggage animals being 
particularly severe (3.51.3–6, 53.3, 7, 10, 56.2, 60.3–4). Despite several resupplies en 
route (3.49.11, 51.12–13), he suggests that the food shortages reduced many of the 
survivors to a state of wretchedness (3.60.4–7). When it came to the digression in 
                                                 
24 Thomas Lenschau in Pauly and Wissowa (eds), Realencyclopädie, 7 (1912), col. 2351; Hoyos, 
Hannibal’s Dynasty, p. 263, n. 6. According to Polyb. 2.1.9, Hasdrubal held the position of trierarch 
under his father-in-law, Hamilcar Barca, and succeeded him to the command in Spain. A certain 
Hannibal, philos of Adherbal, held such a position during the First Punic War (Polyb. 1.44.1). 
25 See Walbank, Historical Commentary, 2.32; Giovanni Brizzi, Studi di storia annibalica (Faenza: 
Stabilimento Grafico Lega, 1984), p. 15, n. 20. Cf. in this paper n. 21. 
26 Although he is opposed to the sensationalist approach to history in general and criticises such 
accounts of Hannibal’s crossing of the Alps (3.47–8), he may have drawn on them for some 
information. See Walbank, Historical Commentary, 1.381–2.  
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Book Nine, readers would recall that Polybius had already asserted the difficulties of 
supply in the Alps. They might then find it credible that Monomachos imagined prior 
to the march that without resort to anthropophagy, the logistical problems would be 
insurmountable.  
Secondly, by arguing that Hannibal carefully investigated and prepared his 
route, Polybius attacks other historians’ versions of the crossing of the Alps (3.47–
48). He claims to have interviewed some of those who took part in the campaign and 
ascertained that Hannibal used native scouts to provide him with reconnaissance 
information before the march, so that he had no need of ‘some god or hero’ to show 
him the way, an epiphany other writers included.27 The theme of Hannibal as 
strategist re-emerges at 9.24 – one of a number of pictures in Polybius of Hannibal 
and his advisors devising operational strategy, particularly in respect to the invasion 
of Italy. In this instance he reports that the general’s council (synedrion) met several 
times to discuss logistical issues. Elsewhere (3.20.8) we learn that the Romans held 
not only Hannibal, but also his synedroi responsible for starting the war: all of them 
should have been surrendered to the Romans as the price for peace. This suggests 
their close implication in his decision-making processes. Prior to Trebbia in 218 BC, 
Hannibal confided his battle-plan to his brother, Mago, and other synedroi (3.71.5). It 
is they who approved and helped to execute it. After Trasimene in 217 BC, Hannibal 
again consulted with his brother and philoi about the course of the campaign 
(3.85.6).28 Indeed, we learn from the list of guarantors (or signatories) in the treaty 
that Hannibal negotiated with Philip V in 215 BC that not only ‘friends’, but also 
members of the Carthaginian senate (gerousiastai) – Mago, Myrcan, Barmocar, and 
                                                 
27 In particular Silenus. See Rawlings, ‘Hannibal and Hercules’, p. 156. 
28 There may have been some separation between a more intimate circle of Hannibal’s philoi and a 
larger group of synedroi. Cf. Greg Daly, Cannae: The Experience of Battle in the Second Punic War 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 127–8. 
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others – accompanied Hannibal into Italy (7.9.1).29 After Trasimene, Hannibal buried 
thirty of his men of the ‘highest birth’ (3.85.5).30
Hannibal’s officers exerted tight control over their troops in battle and were 
trusted to execute vital elements of the battle-plans they had discussed and approved 
collectively.31 However, Hannibal could overturn their judgements on other matters. 
Maharbal was rebuked for negotiating a surrender of the Romans who survived the 
slaughter of Trasimene (3.85). Polybius’ narrative of the Italian campaign becomes 
fragmentary after Cannae (216 BC), so we do not know whether he reported the 
episode of Maharbal offering the advice to Hannibal to march on Rome, or, indeed, 
the former’s candid assessment that Hannibal knew how to win battles but not wars.32 
Yet it would not have been out of keeping for a philos of Hannibal to offer his opinion 
on forthcoming campaign strategy – or at least that is what Polybius, in the 
Monomachos story, would have us believe. It is, after all, an aspect of good 
generalship to entertain all bold and practical plans. Despite his youth, Hannibal had 
been appointed by the army and then by the Carthaginian assembly (3.13) as 
commander-in-chief because, according to Polybius, he combined a daring spirit with 
a quick and fertile brain (2.36.3). His capacity for detailed forward planning is 
                                                 
29 Elias J. Bickerman, ‘Hannibal’s covenant’, American Journal of Philology, 73, 1 (1952), p. 7; 
Walbank, Historical Commentary, 2.44–5; Lancel, Hannibal, p. 117. 
30 Their participation in battle reveals the militarism of the Punic elite. See Walter Ameling, Karthago. 
Studien zu Militär, Staat und Gesellschaft (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1993), pp. 151–81 and Arthur M. 
Eckstein, Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War and the Rise of Rome (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and 
London: University of California Press, 2006), pp. 163–4 and 177. Scholars have realised that Hannibal 
was formally accompanied and advised by representatives of the Carthaginian state, and that they 
served as officers in the army, making it less likely that he was acting without the support of the 
Carthaginian gerousia. Walbank, Historical Commentary, 1.334–5; Hoyos, Hannibal’s Dynasty, pp. 51 
and 88–9. Indeed, Hoyos has demonstrated that the Barcids had the almost complete backing of the 
senate and assembly from 237–204 BC. They were, in effect, the military and political leaders of the 
Carthaginian Empire. B. Dexter Hoyos, ‘Barcid proconsuls and Punic politics 237–218 BC’, 
Rheinisches Museum für Philologie, 137 (1994), pp. 246–74.  
31 Adrian K. Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars (London: Cassell, 2000), pp. 35 and 211–14; Daly, Cannae, 
pp. 127–8 and 133. 
32 Livy 22.51.1–4; cf. Plut. Fab. Max. 17.2; Cato Orig. 4.13. There is no indication in Book Three that 
Polybius knew of the story; he may have chosen to begin Book Seven with a discussion of Hannibal’s 
plans after the aftermath of Cannae. On Maharbal’s advice see B. Dexter Hoyos, ‘Maharbal’s Bon Mot: 
authenticity and survival’, Classical Quarterly, New Series, 50, 2 (2000), pp. 610–14. 
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emphasised in Polybius’ polemical analysis of the crossing of the Alps (3.47–8) and 
in a digression on generalship (9.12–16) where Polybius argues that the ability to 
undertake careful planning is something all generals should possess or acquire 
(9.14.1–5). A commander should consult with those whom he can trust and who are 
intimately involved in the plan (9.13.2–3). Given that a general’s consultation with his 
synedroi is an important aspect of forward planning, the Monomachos anecdote 
serves to demonstrate that, in planning the march across the Alps, Hannibal was 
conforming to Polybian standards of good generalship and rationality (logismos).33 In 
Polybius’ presentation of Hannibal’s war-council and planning processes, the story is 
made to seem entirely plausible: a synedros puts his proposal to the council on the 
important issue of supply; it is discussed and, in this case, rejected by the other 
synedroi and the commander. 
If Hannibal was acting as a good general by considering it, why did he reject 
the plan? After all, Polybius has led the reader to understand that there were supply 
problems on the march, and although there might be doubts about the practicality of 
capturing enough people en route to feed (even in extremis) an army of 40,000 or so, 
he asserts that Hannibal found the suggestion ‘bold and practical’. Polybius does not 
state explicitly why Hannibal demurred. It is only in the much later version of the 
story, related by Dio Cassius, that a reason is supplied: 
When, owing to the numbers in Hannibal’s army, preparations proved inadequate ... and, 
because of this, someone suggested to him that the soldiers be fed on human flesh, he did 
not take the plan amiss, but said he feared that one day, through lack of such bodies, they 
might turn to eating one another (allēlophagia). 
Dio frg 14.57.3 
                                                 
33 For Polybius on generalship see Daly, Cannae, pp. 117–19. On Polybius’ positive appraisal of 
Hannibal’s generalship see Pédech, Méthode historique, pp. 217–19. On Hannibal’s logismos: 
Champion, Cultural Politics, pp. 255–8. 
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According to Dio, Hannibal is keen to preserve this culinary boundary, not because of 
morality or piety, but simply because his army might eventually eat itself. It is unclear 
where Dio obtained his version of Hannibal’s response. It may be a later rhetorical 
flourish added to an account deriving ultimately, from Polybius, or it is possible that 
Polybius omitted or even suppressed an element that existed in his original source(s).  
 
Polybius on cannibalism and Hannibal’s choice  
In order to understand Hannibal’s choice as it appears in the Histories, it is necessary 
to understand Polybius’ view of cannibalism. It seems clear that he could have 
included the view expressed in Dio, since the scenario of soldiers first eating their 
prisoners and slaves and then turning on one another is to be found in a lurid episode 
in Polybius’ work (1.85.1). The episode is doubly relevant because it took place 
amongst rebels who had been besieged by Hannibal’s father, Hamilcar Barca, at Prion 
– a gorge in the Tunisian highlands (c. 238 BC) – during the so-called ‘Truceless 
War’ (241–237 BC). 
This is the only instance of actual cannibalism in the extant parts of the 
Histories, and Polybius appears to have believed that it did occur. Whilst he probably 
followed a pro-Carthaginian account of the revolt of Carthage’s veteran soldiers and 
Libyan subjects after the First Punic War,34 he also took the opportunity to advance 
his own argument about the effects of extreme cruelty, in which the Prion episode 
plays an important part. In Polybius’ view, the rebellion ‘far excelled all wars in 
cruelty (ōmotēta) and the transgression of common law (paranomia)’ (1.88.7). It 
became a ‘truceless war’ because the actions of the protagonists degenerated to the 
point where they did not even respect the sanctity of heralds and where both sides 
                                                 
34 Walbank, Historical Commentary, 1.65 (probably not Philenus); 1.131 the source is unidentified: ‘He 
is a military historian, rather less competent than Philenus, but sharing his enthusiasm for the Barca 
family, and hostile to the mercenaries’. 
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were refused permission to bury their dead.35 Polybius represents the extremity of the 
rebels’ position and their descent to allēlophagia at Prion as divine retribution for 
their violation of human and divine laws (adikia and asebeia). At the start of their 
mutiny, they tortured and mutilated 700 Carthaginians they seized during 
negotiations. 36 This atrocity resulted not only in the hardening of Carthaginian 
attitudes (1.81.1; 82.2), but also in the intimidation and elimination of moderates from 
their own ranks, whose bodies were ‘mangled as if by wild beasts’ (1.80.10). The 
rebels’ mutilation of their prisoners provides Polybius with an opportunity to analyse 
the human condition and the causes of the incurable tumours that afflict men’s souls, 
which can make them so savage (apothērioun) as to extinguish their humanity (Polyb. 
1.81.5, 10); indeed, ‘at the end, no beast is more wicked or cruel than man’ (1.81.7). 
Polybius (1.82.2) states that Hamilcar Barca, whose initial policy of moderation was 
superseded by events, realised that there could be no cure other than extermination. 
Polybius agrees with his prognosis, for he suggests (1.84.10) that Hamilcar received 
the support of divine providence (to daimonion) in his operation to trap the rebel army 
in the gorge of Prion and, through siege, to reduce them to ‘feeding on each other’ 
(estheien allēlōn).37 Polybius clearly believed that their cannibalism was a 
punishment for, as well as a symptom of, their violation of human and divine laws 
(paranomia and asebeia, 1.84.10–11). Their asebeia had been turned upon themselves 
and their annihilation by the Carthaginian elephant corps (1.85.2–7) was not only 
                                                 
35 Polyb. 1.65.6; 1.81.3; 1.82.2; 1.82.10; cf. Aeschin. 2.80; Dem. 18.262. 
36 A fragment (Polyb. 38.8.[2]) survives in which Scipio Aemilianus accuses Hasdrubal of asebeia for 
his treatment of the Roman prisoners during the siege of Carthage in the Third Punic War. At 36.9.15 
Polybius defines asebeia as sin against the gods, parents or the dead, but this is clearly open to 
modification, since 38.8.(2) augments this definition to include those who torture prisoners to a slow 
death. 
37 Polyb. 1.84.9–85.1. Walbank, Historical Commentary, 1.147 (cf. 20–1) equates to daimonion at 
Polyb. 1.84.10 with the retributive aspects of tychē at 4.81.4; 20.7.2 and elsewhere. 
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fully justified, but an exemplar (1.84.10) offered up by Providence.38 Porphyry (de 
abstinentia 2.57) also comments on this episode, reporting that Hamilcar justified the 
elephant attack by stating that, ‘the rebels could not mingle with his men without 
sacrilege’. Cannibalism was an extreme form of pollution in Greek thought and, 
indeed, in the minds of such Hellenised Phoenicians as Porphyry and, arguably, 
Hamilcar.39 Varro’s also asserted its transforming and polluting effect (see above). 
Such pollution, as Detienne recognised, led to the mercenaries’ portrayal as the 
enemies of humanity.40 These men were beasts, fit only to be destroyed by other 
beasts: Hamilcar’s elephants.41
Having established his attitude to the cannibalism of those who were 
excessively cruel, Polybius perhaps expected his reader to understand why Hannibal 
rejected the plan of teaching his troops to practice anthrōpophagia. The danger 
Hannibal faced in allowing them to become man-eaters was not practical, but moral. 
Hannibal inherited the same Carthaginian system that had produced the mercenary 
revolt. His troops were from those regions that, Polybius argues, by bad customs and 
upbringing, rendered the rebels of the Truceless War cruel and beastlike, even to each 
other (1.81.10). The Carthaginian military system inherently promoted a mix (tyrbē) 
of tongues and characters (1.67.3): it was actively encouraged, yet it had the potential, 
when the leaders were ruled by hybris and lust for power (pleonexia, 1.81.11) – as 
                                                 
38 Similarly, in comparing Philip and Antiochus to allelophagous fish, Polybius argues that their 
impiety (asebeia) and cruelty (omōtes) caused Tychē to give them exemplary chastisement (in the form 
of the Romans). Polyb. 15.20; Walbank, Historical Commentary, 2.474. 
39 On Barcid familiarity with Hellenistic language and culture see Hoyos, Hannibal’s Dynasty, p. 281, 
n. 8; Rawlings, ‘Hannibal and Hercules’, p. 160. 
40 Detienne, Dionysos Slain, p. 59. 
41 According to Appian’s account of the campaign against the Numantines, Scipio Aemilianus refused 
to join battle against such ‘wild beasts’ when he could reduce them to eating themselves out of hunger 
(Hisp. 16.97). 
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happened with the rebel leaders – and the anger (orgē) of the soldiers became 
inflamed, to turn warriors into wild beasts (apothērioun 1.67.6).42  
The moral danger to Hannibal was posed by the choices he would have to 
make in his leadership of the army and conduct of the war. These would determine 
whether he and his army would become cruel and impious beasts.43 The image of 
commanders who unlocked their bestial androphagy through acts of cruelty and 
impiety appears to be one that Polybius finds ‘good to think with’, and he employs it 
as a tool for didactic allegory on several occasions. He explains, for example, that 
Philip V, in his massacre of the Messenians and subsequent actions, ‘if he seemed to 
have gained a taste for human blood and the slaughter and betrayal of allies, did not 
actually turn from man to wolf, as in the Arcadian myth mentioned by Plato, but from 
king into a bitter (pikros) tyrant’.44 The Megalopolitan Polybius here alludes to a 
piece of local mythology that had found its way into Plato’s discussion of tyranny 
(Rep. 8.565d–e).45 The Arcadians apparently believed that those who ate human meat 
would become werewolves, and their early king Lycaon was so transformed after 
performing human sacrifice.46 Whilst not actually drinking human blood or eating 
human flesh, Philip, just as if he were Plato’s tyrant, had taken a step on the road to 
bestiality in his massacre of fellow Greeks. Polybius further employs the wolf 
metaphor to describe Philip’s actions in Caria, where ‘he lived the life of the wolf, as 
                                                 
42 On mercenaries posing a threat to themselves and the social order see Eckstein, Moral Vision, pp. 
125–9; cf. also pp. 174–7 on the Truceless War. 
43 For the view that Polybius thought armies tended to be reflections of their commanders see Eckstein, 
Moral Vision, p. 192–3 and n. 113. 
44 Polyb. 7.13.7–8. Pikros carries the resonance of a bitter taste. Liddell-Scott, s.v. pikros.  
45 von Scala, Studien des Polybios, I, p. 20, n. 2 and p. 99; Walbank, Historical Commentary, 2.61; 
Eckstein, Moral Vision, p. 90, n. 15. 
46 Apollodorus 3.8.1; Paus. 8.2.1–6; Ovid Metamorph. 1.228 ff. Pausanias’ description of the action of 
Lycaon implies consumption of parts of the victim, as was usual in Greek sacrifice; Ovid’s version has 
a meal of human flesh prepared for Jupiter, whilst Plato (8.565e) relates how human entrails were 
mixed with those of sacrificial victims. See Walter Burkert, Homo Necans: The Anthropology of 
Ancient Greek Sacrificial Ritual (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983), pp. 
83–93 and 103–9. On Greek lycanthropy see Richard Buxton, ‘Wolves and werewolves in Greek 
thought’, in Jan Bremmer (ed.), Interpretations of Greek Mythology (London: Routledge, 1987), pp. 
60–80; Kunstler, ‘Werewolf figure’, passim. 
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the saying goes. By preying on some and thieving, by putting pressure on others, and 
contrary to his own nature, by cringing to others, since his army was starving, he 
sometimes managed to obtain supplies of meat, sometimes figs and sometimes 
inadequate amounts of corn’ (16.24.4–5). Despite the evident necessity of feeding his 
troops, Philip is condemned by Polybius for his actions; wolf-like,47 he is portrayed as 
the enemy of humanity, menacing civilised communities, and – like a tyrant who 
preys on his own people – devastating the territory of Alabanda, ‘as if it were enemy 
land’ (16.24.8). 
Polybius employs strongly condemnatory language in his analysis of the 
actions of Philip elsewhere. He argues that by agreeing to carve up the kingdom of 
young Ptolemy Epiphanes, both Philip and Antiochus acted worse than tyrants, who, 
at least, dreamed up pretexts (15.20.3). Their actions were ‘savage (ōmotēs) towards 
men’ and ‘impious (asebēs) to the gods’, being, in fact, so ‘unscrupulous and bestial’ 
(anedēn kai thēriōdōs) that they could be described by the proverb about the lives of 
fish: ‘although of one tribe, the destruction of the smaller is the food and life of the 
larger’ (15.20.4). By referring to myths and proverbs, Polybius draws on a common 
strain in Greek thought that metaphorically, if not actually, men became beasts once 
they lose sight of human values. ‘Zeus ordained’, says Hesiod (W&D 276–8), ‘that it 
would be the fish, birds and beasts that would eat one another (allēlōn esthiō) since 
they do not possess rightness (dikē)’, a value humans shared with the divine. 
Lawlessness (adikia, paranomia), then, was akin to bestiality, and the deliberate 
                                                 
47 Note that to sustain his metaphor, Polybius chooses to head the list of supplies with the predator’s 
meat (krea) whilst suggesting that the cultivator’s corn (sitaria) was less than sufficient. 
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actions of tyrannical rulers or the inflamed passions of a rebel army could turn men 
(metaphorically, if not always actually) into allelophagous beasts.48
On one level, then, Hannibal’s rejection of the anthropophagic plan serves to 
enhance his reputation and reveal his character. Apparently Polybius assumes that 
Hannibal, like his father at Prion, would refuse to be tainted by the unholiness and 
bestiality of the practice. Indeed, when his men were rendered ‘in their external 
appearance and general condition more like beasts than men’ by the privations of the 
crossing of the Alps, Polybius asserts that it was Hannibal who ‘made every provision 
to restore the body and spirit of the men’ (3.60.6–7). Throughout his account of the 
war, Polybius emphasises how Hannibal exercised great skill as a general in 
controlling and maintaining his army.49 According to Aelian (3.4), Polybius in his 
Tactics defined good generalship as the imposition of order upon a mob. Armies are 
successful when they have been moulded into shape by the general. Polybius regarded 
generalship as the best opportunity for a man to demonstrate his mastery over chaos, 
disorder, and the barbarism of his soldiers, as Eckstein observes.50 Furthermore, 
Hannibal’s rejection of the advice of Monomachos creates an implicit contrast with 
the wolf-like Philip, who, in Polybius’ view, succumbed to the bad advice of his 
companions and came to act like a cannibalistic tyrant.51 The effect is to include 
Hannibal among the civilised leaders of the world.52
                                                 
48 On adikia in Polybius see Champion, who notes several examples applied to tyrants, mob rule and 
barbarian societies. Champion, Cultural Politics, p. 241. See p. 244 for further discussion and 
references to theriodes and apotherioumai.  
49 3.44.10–13; 54.2, 55, 87.1–3, 111.1; 11.19.3–5; Eckstein, Moral Vision, p. 168–9. 
50 Eckstein, Moral Vision, pp. 162–3. 
51 Cf. Lucilius (Satires frg. 952–3), who calls Hannibal ‘that old sly-boots, that wolf’. 
52 Pédech, Méthode historique, p. 217; Eckstein, Moral Vision, p. 177. 
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Polybius and Barcid atrocities 
Polybius clearly admired Hannibal’s judgements and the outcomes of many of his 
actions.53 He was, however, confronted by a number of Hannibal’s deeds that other 
writers considered excessively cruel. As we have seen, Polybius had recourse to the 
argument that Hannibal’s conduct was the result of external pressure, rather than his 
own true (civilised) character, but the attempt to shift the blame for Hannibal’s cruel 
acts in Italy onto Monomachos seems rather like scapegoating and, moreover, does 
not appear clearly thought through. Polybius argues that a single piece of advice 
reveals the character of Monomachos (9.24.3), yet all the actions of Hannibal Barca in 
Italy do not reveal his. Polybius’ contention is that the commonly accepted view of 
Hannibal’s cruel character was due, in part, to the actions of his companions. In this 
instance, however, neither Hannibal nor his synedroi are willing to go to the extremes 
that Monomachos proposes. So the council of Carthaginian gerousiastai and the 
trusted philoi who give Hannibal advice do have some redeeming features, and 
Monomachos, the single-fighter, is portrayed as the only advocate of the inhuman and 
impious policy of anthrōpophagia. Polybius seems to be trying to have it both ways 
though: he argues that bad advice inevitably changes a man’s character and asserts 
that it was his advisors (and the difficult conditions he faced) that adversely 
influenced Hannibal’s character;54 but he shows Hannibal rejecting Monomachos’ 
evil advice, and is evasive about the specific atrocities Monomachos is supposed to be 
responsible for – at least in the extant parts of the Histories. If Hannibal’s actions and 
reputation are shaped partly by his friends, then Monomachos’ actions and reputation 
for cruelty must equally be a product of his companions. Surely the commander-in-
chief, who issues instructions and should have some element of control, ought 
                                                 
53 Pédech, Méthode historique, pp. 217–19; Champion, Cultural Politics, p. 117, n. 62. 
54 Polyb. 9.26.1. See Eckstein, Moral Vision, p. 240. 
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therefore to take some of the blame for the activities of his subordinates, including 
Monomachos. Regardless of whether this man actually perpetrated cruelties in Italy or 
was an officer who has become a scapegoat in the rhetoric of Polybius (and possibly 
his sources), the blame for the atrocities committed must rest, to some extent, with 
Hannibal Barca. After all, this is where most of the extant authors seem content to 
place it. 
Whilst his argument about the influence of companions is not wholly 
convincing, particularly in the attempt to blame Monomachos, Polybius does have a 
get-out clause. Although he accuses Monomachos of some of the acts of cruelty, 
Polybius claims that other atrocities attributed to Hannibal were due to the pressures 
of circumstance (9.24.8, 26.1–10), arguing (9.24.3) that his entire narrative of the war 
justifies this theory. Polybius’ overall treatment of Barcid cruelties therefore needs to 
be compared with his argument in 9.24. Towards the end of his digression on 
Hannibal’s character he points out that, particularly in the years after the fall of Capua 
(211 BC) when other allies wavered and several Roman armies simultaneously 
campaigned against him, Hannibal was forced to pull back and consolidate, 
withdrawing garrisons and breaking obligations he had made to protect certain 
communities (9.26.2–6). In Polybius’ view, breaking agreements guaranteed by oaths 
sworn to the gods left him open to accusations of impiety (asebeia 9.26.8), whilst 
charges of cruelty (ōmotēta) seem to relate to the attendant and sometimes forced 
evacuation of populations, as well as to the plunder of allied and abandoned cities 
(9.26.6–7). Polybius readily admits that Hannibal sanctioned these acts and that they 
caused great offence amongst the allies because robbery, murder, and violence 
accompanied them (9.26.9). He emphasises, however, that both departing troops and 
incoming (presumably Roman) soldiers perpetrated the crimes and that the inhabitants 
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who remained in such afflicted cities had to live with the suspicion of their being loyal 
to the enemy (9.26.9–10). He implies that in these cases, Hannibal, a good general 
forced to yield to circumstance, has received the blame for some of the traditional 
pastimes of the soldiery.55
Polybius’ inclusion of the cannibalism story suggests that earlier accounts of 
Hannibal’s cruelties went beyond the accusations of treaty-breaking and forced 
transplantations of populations from cities. They may have included stories of the 
massacre or mistreatment of prisoners. Appian, for example, records that Hannibal 
(Hann. 3.14; cf. Zonaras 8.26) had some 5,000 prisoners executed when he made the 
famous night escape involving oxen with burning faggots tied to their horns. On 
another occasion, Hannibal apparently burned the wife and children of Dasius.56 
Valerius Maximus (9.2 Ext. 2) wrote of exhausted prisoners being abandoned on the 
march, the foreparts of their feet hacked away. Had he chosen to mention them, it is 
possible that Polybius might have blamed such brutalities on Monomachos.  
That is not to say that Polybius excludes examples of the deliberate 
mistreatment of prisoners by Hannibal entirely. Prior to the battle of Trebbia, 
Hannibal organised death or victory monomachiai between Gallic prisoners (3.62–3). 
Polybius says that he deliberately treated them in a malicious (kakon) way by binding 
them in heavy chains; their bodies became disfigured by blows and they suffered 
much from hunger (3.62.4). The redeeming feature of this treatment in Polybius’ eyes 
is its exemplary purpose: the contests provided not only entertainment but also 
education (paideia) for the troops, 57 for they showed them the meaning of defeat or 
                                                 
55 Eckstein, Moral Vision, pp. 125–9 and 166–9. 
56 App. Hann. 5.31; cf. Livy 24.45 who claims Hannibal was disguising his avarice towards Dasius’ 
estates with this act of cruelty. 
57 On paideia as a Hellenistic virtue important to Polybius’ ethical position and historical purpose see 
von Scala, Studien des Polybios, I, pp. 18–19; Meissner, ‘Polybios’, pp. 338–46; Eckstein, Moral 
Vision, pp. 248–50. 
Cardiff Historical Papers 2007/9 
Hannibal the cannibal? 23
victory – a point made by Hannibal in a speech in which he justified this treatment of 
the prisoners to his men (3.63).58 This is an example of what Davidson terms a 
‘didactic arena’, revealing Polybius’ intention to use his writing to educate his 
readership through the representation of events and the reaction to the spectacle of its 
witnesses.59 Such a set piece would suggest to the audience that when Hannibal did 
act cruelly, he did so with justification. Furthermore, Polybius makes Hannibal 
himself argue that his treatment of the prisoners was due to the pressure of 
circumstance – of needing, at the point of engaging the Romans for the first time in 
Italy, to convince his army of the serious consequences of defeat (3.63.1–2). The 
argument appears to be aimed as much at Polybius’ audience as at Hannibal’s men. 
Readers of the argument on cruelty in the Hannibalic aristeia (9.24.3, 10; 9.26) might 
recall how the lesson of the monomachiai in Book Three, in which prisoners were 
forced to destroy one another, seemed on the surface an act of cruelty but was, in fact, 
a rational act of skilful generalship, driven by the need for Hannibal to get his army 
successfully through the extreme test of battle. 
Polybius’ attitude to other atrocities, particularly the massacre of prisoners by 
Hannibal, is also shaped by the argument of circumstance. He does not relate the 
killings of prisoners after Cannae or of stragglers on the march (see above), which 
suggests either that he did not think they occurred or that they were not relevant 
enough to his purposes to be included. Instead, he describes how, after victories at 
Trebbia (3.77.3–7) and Trasimene (3.85.1–5; Livy 22.7; App. Hann. 2.10), Hannibal 
                                                 
58 The prisoners were forced to fight each other for the chance to win a horse, a cloak, and to wear 
panoply that Gallic kings usually donned for such single combats (3.62.5–6). Although displaying an 
understanding of Gallic warrior ethos, which appreciated the glory to be earned in victory or martial 
death, Hannibal exploited it for his own ends. See Rawlings, ‘Celts, Spaniards and Samnites’, p. 89. 
Polybius emphasises that the victors and the vanquished together were regarded as ‘fortunate’ by the 
spectators (3.62.10–11). In winning or being slain, these prisoners were to be delivered from their 
misery: captivity, pain, and hunger. 
59 On the multiple perspectives of the participants, the observing soldiers, the general, the historian, and 
his readership in this episode and elsewhere see James Davidson, ‘The Gaze in Polybius’ Histories’, 
Journal of Roman Studies, 81 (1991), pp. 14–16. 
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freed non-Roman prisoners in an attempt to portray himself as a liberator and to 
encourage the allies to revolt.60 Although he kept the Romans on minimum rations 
(3.77.3), at least after Cannae Hannibal attempted to ransom those who had fallen into 
his hands (6.58; Cic. off. 3.113 ff.; cf. Livy 22.58–61). However, Polybius does reveal 
that directly after Trasimene, on his march to the Adriatic coast through Umbria and 
Picenum, all men of military age encountered on the route were killed, ‘owing to his 
deep-seated hatred of the Romans’ (3.86.11). Polybius notes that these orders were 
like those given on the assault of a city when victory was assured.61 He makes little 
more of these actions, and it is not clear whether he thought this became standard 
policy or represented a brief outburst of bloodletting in the flush of a victory. Even if 
the latter is suggested by the comparison with the sack of a city, this episode seems to 
contradict Hannibal’s actions immediately after the battle, and may in fact have 
dented his image and discouraged potential defectors.62 It is usually explained as an 
instance of the wrath of the Barcids.63 This it may well be, but the ‘hatred of the 
Romans’ displayed on the march to the Adriatic is an aspect that Polybius chooses to 
gloss over in his analysis of Hannibal’s cruelty at 9.22–6.  
                                                 
60 Trebbia: 3.77.3–7. Trasimene: 3.85.1–5; Livy 22.7; App. Hann. 2.10. If Monomachos proposed 
exocannibalism, which would have had to have been performed on captured enemies, it was a notion 
that appears to run counter to Barcid policy. Hamilcar’s original programme of leniency towards and 
recruitment of defeated enemies during the initial stages of the Truceless War was a practice he 
recommenced in Spain (Diod. 25.10.1), and it was also a central feature of Hannibal’s policy in Italy. 
Rawlings, ‘Hannibal and Hercules’, pp. 168–70; James S. Reid, ‘Problems of the Second Punic War: 
III. Rome and her Italian allies’, Journal of Roman Studies, 5 (1915), pp. 87–124, esp. pp. 92–3. 
61 Later in the year (217 BC) Hannibal did indeed take a city, Gerunium, by storm and ‘destroyed its 
inhabitants’ (Polyb. 3.100.4). This passes without comment, but Polybius has already prepared the 
reader for the normality of the act with the statement about the march to the Adriatic (3.86.11): ‘for as 
at the capture of cities by assault, the order had been given to put to the sword all adults that fell into 
their hands’. On the commonality of the practice in siege warfare (by Carthaginians and Romans) in 
Italy see A. Ziolkowski, ‘Urbs direpta, or how the Romans sacked cities’, in John Rich and Graham 
Shipley (eds), War and Society in the Roman World (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 69–
91, citing, in particular, Livy 21.57.13–14 (the sack of Victumulae by Hannibal in 218 BC). Cf. App. 
Pun. 63, where a relative of the consul Cornelius Lentulus claimed that Hannibal destroyed Roman 
allied cities, and depopulated 400 towns during his campaigns in Italy. On the normalcy of the practice 
in Greek siege warfare see William K. Pritchett, The Greek State at War, vol. 5 (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 203–23. 
62 Reid, ‘Problems of the Second Punic War: III’, p. 93. 
63 Christ, ‘Zur Beurteilung Hannibals’, p. 464; cf. Champion, Cultural Politics, p. 120, n. 72. 
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Elsewhere Polybius acknowledges that motives of anger and hatred allow one 
to view Hannibal’s actions as justified, since ‘in any such case the final assessment of 
good or evil lies not in the actions themselves, but in the different reasons and 
different purposes of those who do them’ (2.56.16). The author claims that one might 
be ‘outraged if someone beats a free man, but if this happened to one who had struck 
the first blow, we consider he has been rightly punished’ (2.56.14). Polybius considers 
the Carthaginians’ anger and their desire for vengeance a just motive for the war: ‘if 
we take the cause of the war to have been the seizure of Sardinia and the tribute then 
extracted, we must admit that the Carthaginians had good reason (eulogos) for 
entering into the Hannibalic war, since having yielded only to circumstances, they 
now availed themselves of circumstances to be avenged on those who had injured 
them’.64 Thus ‘hatred of the Romans’ seems to Polybius a sufficient and self-
evidently just reason for Hannibal’s bloodletting after Trasimene.65
Polybius’ attitude to Hannibal’s cruelties in Italy appears to conform to his 
argument of circumstance advanced in the Hannibalic aristeia (9.22–6). The acts 
seem acceptable from Polybius’ moral perspective too: hatred and vengeance are 
sometimes justified; violence to prisoners, when it serves the higher purpose of 
paideia – in educating men of their true situation and so encouraging them to rise 
above it, as at Trebbia – can even be considered an aspect of good generalship. 
                                                 
64 3.30.4; cf. 3.10. See John Rich, ‘The origins of the Second Punic War’, in Tim Cornell, Boris 
Rankov, and Philip Sabin (eds), The Second Punic War: a Reappraisal (Bulletin of the Institute of 
Classical Studies, supp. 67, 1996), esp. pp. 7–9 on this passage. Rich observes that Polybius thought 
the Carthaginians were justified in taking revenge when they had the opportunity. Note that at 2.36.6 
Polybius calls the war one of revenge. Walbank, Historical Commentary, 1.215; cf. Arthur M. 
Eckstein, ‘Hannibal at New Carthage: Polybius 3.15 and the power of irrationality’, Classical 
Philology, 84, 1 (1989), p. 8, who overlooks the eulogia of Punic vengeance of 3.30 in his discussion. 
On the execution of prisoners see Pritchett, The Greek State at War, vol. 5, pp. 203–23, esp. p. 203: ‘no 
uniform practice’ was apparent amongst Greeks for when such actions were considered appropriate or 
otherwise. On vengeance in Greek warfare see Jon E. Lendon, ‘Homeric vengeance and the outbreak of 
Greek wars’, in Hans van Wees (ed.), War and Violence in Ancient Greece (London and Swansea: 
Duckworth and the Classical Press of Wales, 2000), pp. 1–30. 
65 Eckstein, Mediterranean Anarchy, p. 169 and n. 218. 
Cardiff Historical Papers 2007/9 
Louis Rawlings 26 
Conclusion 
Polybius’ treatment of Monomachos’ advocacy of cannibalism deserves to be 
recognised as an important contribution to the historian’s representation of Hannibal. 
It reveals some of the subtleties and complexities of Polybius’ historical method and 
lends support to those who see Polybius’ approach to the great captains of his age as 
largely ethically driven.66
Ultimately Polybius rejects the tradition of cannibalism, but he avoids the 
straightforward option of dismissing it as a wild exaggeration. Instead he asserts its 
plausibility because, coming from the cruel Monomachos and coupled with his own 
(and broader Greek) attitudes to cannibalism, it serves his dual polemical purpose. On 
the one hand it supports his argument about the dynamic inter-relationship between 
character and external stimuli; on the other it adds weight to his contention that 
Hannibal has been unfairly represented as excessively cruel. In his attack on this 
‘flawed’ approach to character analysis, Polybius’ argument is not entirely 
convincing. This is because the example, beyond being impractical, does not 
demonstrate one of the main points of his argument, which is that his companions’ 
advice did violence to Hannibal’s character. In fact, since Hannibal rejects the plan to 
resort to cannibalism, it suggests the opposite. Furthermore, his argument falls foul of 
its own logic, such that Hannibal ought to take some responsibility for shaping the 
character of his subordinates. Nevertheless, in arguing that the pressures of 
circumstance forced the Carthaginian to act against his will, Polybius is able to shift 
some of the blame onto Hannibal’s soldiers. One might suggest that this shows that 
the general fails to exert sufficient control over their actions, but elsewhere (including 
in the march across the Alps), Polybius argues that Hannibal kept their bestial 
                                                 
66 See Eckstein, Moral Vision, esp. pp. 249–50, 254–7, 273–6, and above n. 7. 
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potential in check in exemplary fashion. Even when confronted with Hannibal’s 
voluntary actions, Polybius argues that although they might seem cruel to some 
observers, they were justified. In mistreating Gallic prisoners, Hannibal demonstrated 
his ability to show his men the true nature of their situation and to inspire them to 
victory, and this serves in turn to educate Polybius’ audience. In massacring those 
men of military age he encountered after Trasimene, he took advantage of the 
situation to right a wrong, that is, to obtain vengeance for the Romans’ deeds. In these 
instances, Hannibal’s character appears as much governed by Polybian morality as by 
military necessity. Indeed, the practicality of becoming cannibalistic is defeated by 
Hannibal’s moral considerations: he could not persuade himself to adopt the plan 
because of the implicit moral danger that it posed to him and his men. Whilst not 
always effectively presented, Polybius’ treatment of Hannibal’s reputation for cruelty 
demonstrates his willingness to imagine the Carthaginian not just as a practical 
commander, but also as a moral one. 
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